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Educational historians, philosophers, and sociologists have long warned that the 
increasing encroachment of business logic in public schools bodes ill for democracy 
as a way of life. Many have concluded that the business person’s interest in affect-
ing public education is to bring about a greater bottom line, which, of course, is 
profit, albeit secured in the name of democratic freedom and social progress. These 
scholars have noted that the corporate parasite is eating away the insides of our 
public schools and is reproducing its hereditary material (consumer materialism) 
within the bodies and souls of its captive hosts: our children. Through corporate 
advertisements on school walls, corporate-sponsored curriculum materials and 
programs, and corporate-sponsored fundraisers and contests (not to mention the 
enormous political influence corporations have in framing the very aim and pur-
pose of public education), corporations use schools as conduits by which to estab-
lish consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory democracy and, thus, 
as the supreme good and standard of personal growth. Drawing upon the work of 
John Dewey, this paper articulates a conception of democracy and a democratic 
theory of education that privileges the social over the private, the public over the 
corporate, such that the homo-economicus ideal that our public schools train our 
children to aspire to on a daily basis is checked by a wider commitment to the good 
life, defined in more socially benevolent ways.
Introduction
Over the past decade, my children along with millions of other children attending 
our nation’s public schools have been marketed to in schools more so than at any 
other time in the history of public schooling. On any given day, students across the 
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country ride to school on buses draped with Coca-Cola ads. They are shown two 
minutes of paid corporate advertisement on Channel One (two minutes per day × 
180 school days = 360 minutes or 6 hours of watching corporate advertisement per 
year). Some win a personal pan pizza from Pizza Hut’s Book-It program simply for 
reading a quantity of books. For those who do not qualify for the pizza award, they 
still have the opportunity to buy Pizza Hut pizza, Taco Bell burritos, or McDonald’s 
hamburgers in their school cafeterias. Others have the additional opportunity to 
wash these food items down with 20 oz. Cokes or Mountain Dews bought out of 
hallway vending machines. Later on in the day, some students calculate the area of 
Nabisco’s Oreo cookie, while others conduct tests to see if Prego spaghetti sauce is 
thicker than its competitors’. Still others, like my own kids, attend Reader’s Digest/
Q.S.P.- sponsored fundraisers set up to entice students to raise much-needed funds 
for their “cash-challenged” school. And at the end of the day, many students, text-
books covered with jackets advertising Clairol or Reebok clutched snuggly under 
their arms, ride home on Pepsi-bannered buses.
Educational historians, philosophers, and sociologists have long warned that 
the increasing encroachment of business logic in public schools bodes ill for de-
mocracy as a way of life. Many have concluded that the business person’s interest in 
affecting public education is to bring about a greater bottom line, which, of course, 
is profit, albeit secured in the name of democratic freedom and social progress. 
These scholars have noted that the corporate parasite is eating away the insides of 
our public schools and is reproducing its hereditary material (consumer material-
ism) within the bodies and souls of its captive hosts: our children.1 Through cor-
porate advertisements on school walls, corporate-sponsored curriculum materials 
and programs, and corporate-sponsored fundraisers and contests (not to mention 
the enormous political influence corporations have in framing the very aim and 
purpose of public education), corporations come to control the particular condi-
tions within schools that feed shared habits and, therefore, command impulse, 
need, want, and desire. 
How corporations have come to use schools as conduits by which to establish 
consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory democracy and, thus, as 
the supreme good and standard of personal growth is a complex, richly- textured 
tale well documented and better told by others.2 Drawing upon the work of John 
Dewey, this paper articulates a conception of democracy and a democratic theory 
of education that privileges the social over the private, the public over the corpo-
rate, such that the homo-economicus ideal that our public schools train our chil-
dren to aspire to on a daily basis is checked by a wider commitment to the good 
life, defined in more socially benevolent ways. Along the way, this paper under-
scores the necessity of a democratic education in light of the understanding that 
human beings are always in relations of power (effective capacity), the signifi-
cance of which depends upon human perception and judgment of the actual and 
potential consequences on the growth of shared habit. Consequently, this paper 
stresses the necessity of seeing education as an inherently political undertaking, 
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insofar as education refers to the conscious deliberation about and struggle over 
valued ends, shared activities, and, thus, forms of power to be fostered or expunged 
from collective experience. Since education is concerned with the specific forms 
of community life that should be brought about, an adequate democratic theory of 
education demands a careful consideration for the consequences of these forms on 
individual growth, which in turn demands an increased sensitivity for expectations 
and claims of right intrinsic to these forms. In other words, education inextrica-
bly is involved in the struggle over power, over what the “good life” should mean, 
over what democracy should mean and how this meaning should be cultivated in 
the characters of those who will be entrusted with its realization and direction. 
Therefore, this paper emphasizes Dewey’s point that the ideal of democracy can 
be realized only to the degree that schools aim to cultivate socially and politically 
engaged citizens who are sympathetically and critically responsive to the demand 
of democratic justice as it is manifested through the particular activities in which 
they take part. Furthermore, it makes the pedagogical point that only by engag-
ing individuals to take up the actual social, economic, and political problems that 
affect them in every phase of their lives can an education develop citizens sensi-
tively, intelligently, and responsibly charged enough to struggle over the meaning 
of democratic community and to fight hegemonic relations that preclude individual 
freedom and social equality. 
A Parent’s Problem
In light of the vast technological and social changes accompanying industrial capi-
talism, particularly as more and more people gained access to consumer goods and 
services that were once accessible only by the rich, capitalism spoke to the mate-
rial needs of the masses and thus, as Joel Spring has pointed out, the development 
of human capital became “the most important goal of the educational system in 
the twentieth century.”3 As Merle Curti put it in the 1930s, “Educators accepted, 
in general, the businessman’s outlook and consciously or unconsciously molded 
the school system to accord with the canons of a profit-making system.”4 With the 
National Association of Manufacturers reports in 1905 and in 1912 breathing fear 
into the public that foreign competitors were advancing on U.S. markets and thus 
threatening the American way of life, the conditions were ripe for the business hero 
to apply his logic of volume, efficiency, and control and his practices of scientific 
management to education and save the highest form of civilization ever achieved by 
humankind.5 Consequently, the seizure of school boards and schools by business-
men allowed them to turn public schools into factories processing a standard way 
of looking at experience and a standard set of skills necessary to “succeed” in this 
experience. For the better part of a century now, schools have manufactured a public 
consciousness acquiescent to the needs and demands of a profit-seeking economic 
system and generations have been saturated with the belief that one “gets” an edu-
cation in order to get a good job, which, in turn, will allow one to buy oneself, to 
purchase self-respect, personal and collective identity, security, and freedom. With 
E&C ♦  Education and Culture
46  ♦ Randall S. Hewitt
schools dying, and warping and weaving students into consumer materialists, all 
that was needed was a company store.
Over the past twenty years, businesses have marketed to students inside 
schools more than at any other time in the history of public schooling. From Kroger-
sponsored “school-to-work” programs to Reader’s Digest-sponsored “be a good 
citizen” fundraisers, from Pizza Hut “read-a-book” incentive program to Exxon-
sponsored “oil spill good for the . . . environmental science lessons,” from Coke in 
the lunch room to Pepsi on the scoreboards, school buses, and schoolhouse door, 
the Citicorp-IBM public school has become what Alex Molnar has called an “edu-
cational flea market open to anyone who has the money to set up a table.”6 As Deron 
Boyles effectively argues in American Education and Corporations, schools serve 
as sites for consumer materialism in at least two ways. First, overemphasizing ba-
sic-skills training to the detriment of cultivating capacities for critical intelligence 
aimed at securing democratic justice, schools reinforce the idea that one “gets” 
an “education” solely to generate economic capital, which allows for greater levels 
of consumption. Second, through business-school partnerships schools welcome 
the marketing of corporate goods, which are portrayed as essential to personal 
and social welfare. In consequence, schools reinforce the idea to students that the 
production and consumption of goods is the essence of individual happiness and 
civic obligation. Business not only has a young, highly impressionable, and cap-
tive market but one that, by virtue of schoolhouse training, is “ripe to be gulled,” 
one ready and willing to sell all sorts of corporate trinket items, secure in the belief 
that one is participating in generating much-needed funds for one’s cash-strapped 
school—community service for a common good.
Until my own children started attending public schools, I had considered 
the educational aim of cultivating human capital and business-school partnership 
practices merely as problems for democracy in theory. However, these theoretical 
problems became real problems to me last May when my first grader brought home 
an “educational” product called Summer Vacation. This self-titled “edutainment,” 
produced and marketed by Entertainment Publications Operating Company, in-
cluded a workbook that could be purchased for $11.99 and a CD, contained in glitzy 
packaging with a three-dimensional figure on the cover, that could be purchased 
separately for $18.99. (Software plus workbook could be purchased for $27.99.) On 
the back cover of the packaging, the company maintained that the purchase of this 
product would ensure that children not lose up to 25 percent of their reading or 
math skills during the summer, a possibility that studies (although only one was 
cited) reveal can happen. Summer Vacation, the company contends, is a “valuable 
investment in your child’s future.” An information sheet accompanying the product 
stated that the school and its students may receive special prizes just for participat-
ing. This edutainment product is grade-specific and came home with every child 
at the elementary school, a school that has a total enrollment of 695 children, 46.3 
percent of whom qualify for the federal free/reduced price lunch program. 
Within the prevailing discourse on business-school partnerships, there is 
nothing objectionable about this situation. A for-profit corporation is giving back 
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to the community by offering a product for purchase designed to enhance a specific 
public good (student achievement). Furthermore, such practices as listed above 
constitute a “win-win” solution for the pressing financial problems that our pub-
lic schools face and provide real-world opportunities for students to develop the 
habits of mind necessary to be productive citizens of a twenty-first century global 
marketplace. Since it is primarily through the free market, proponents of business-
school partnerships point out, that individuals concretely express their freedom 
to choose, then it is paramount that public schools empower students with the 
affections, skills, and intelligence necessary for students to develop themselves as 
they see fit within this twenty-first-century free market context. Obtaining input, 
guidance, and participation from those most successful in this context (business 
people) is central and vital to the schools’ mission. 
Critics of business-school partnership, however, claim that such partner-
ships encourage students wrongly to equate consumerism with democracy, thus 
strengthening the ideological control that corporations have over the public mind. 
Proponents of business-school partnerships assert that market democracy is the 
outcome of people expressing and satisfying their needs and desires through eco-
nomic means. Therefore, market democracy unquestionably remains the most flex-
ible living option for people in the real world. Telling people how they should see 
democracy, the proponents say, is itself anti-democratic, contradictory to the very 
tenet of freedom of choice, and the luxury of academicians who must feed—and 
often do so quite comfortably—at the same trough as everyone else.
The proponents’ response is predictable and saddening. It is predictable be-
cause the institutionalization of consumer materialism has become so thorough 
that its ideals and standards have become intertwined with the very fiber of who 
we are as a people. Furthermore, the institutionalization of consumer materialism 
through public education precludes the development of critical habits of mind and 
civic virtues necessary for a public to take a look at itself. Any criticism of consumer 
materialism naturally is resented as an attack upon what is truest and most mean-
ingful about us as individuals and as a public. What more, then, can be expected 
than reactionary dismissal? It is saddening because without the ability to take a 
look at itself, the public becomes easily hoodwinked. Easily hoodwinked, the pub-
lic becomes susceptible to forms of insidious power arrangements that nurture in-
dividuals’ desires to serve the interest of the few and come to legitimize their own 
subjugation as reasonable and natural.
A Deweyan Perspective
As Dewey repeatedly notes, democracy requires not only courageous involvement 
but also the honest and open sharing of ideas such that each individual alerts, in-
forms, and enriches the lives of others. To Dewey, the identification of power is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, task in releasing individual capacities to expand and 
enrich the meaning of the common good. Illuminating the effects of power within 
shared activity serves as a beginning, not an end, for a public to form a definite 
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idea of itself. Perception of effects on shared habits is an occasion to exchange and 
judge differing ideas, to fill out and correct competing perspectives. It provides an 
opportunity for individuals to become conscious of those influencing associations 
of which they are unaware, such that possibilities of growth in interests, desires, 
capacities, and resources are suggested and shared. As Dewey maintains, “Democ-
racy is itself an educational principle, an educational measure and policy,” insofar 
as education means fostering, cultivating, and sharpening individual capacities 
through communication.7 Through the constant give and take of ideas, mere as-
sociation can tighten into a community in which the activity of each is referred 
with interest to the activities of others.
In the broadest sense, then, democracy rests upon the working faith that 
community life is infinitely more powerful in securing a just balance between in-
dividual freedom and social equality than is any other mode of associated living. 
Education serves as the most conscious and surest means by which this faith can 
be nourished in principle and birthed as a living power through individual char-
acter. As Dewey puts it, “Democracy has to be born anew every generation, and 
education is its midwife.”8
A Philosophical Warrant for a Democratic Theory of Education
Every theory of education rests upon philosophical assumptions that provide a 
foundational warrant for its normative prescriptions. A brief sketch of the philo-
sophical warrant necessary for a democratic theory of education follows.
According to Dewey’s ontological account, human beings ineluctably share in 
concrete activities that yield concrete results. Simply put, shared activities provide 
human beings with the fundamental means of living and learning. They are the 
essential substances through which individuals acquire and refine their special af-
fections, dexterities, and aptitudes. They are the media by which individuals more 
or less develop a sense of the shared goods directing their effective capacities and 
of the common standards, expectations, and claims of right by which to judge their 
efforts and sharpen their judgments. Fundamentally, shared habit is social power, 
the ability to act so as to affect the social environment, the growth and direction 
of which depends directly upon the human responsibility to define and measure 
the moral significance of its execution. That is, the determination of power (effec-
tive capacity) as enhancing or debilitating rests upon some person attempting to 
discover and judge the consequences of a particular line of conduct on the growth 
of his or her interests, skills, desires, habits, and ways of forming ends and on the 
shared arrangements, opportunities, and materials that nourish the active par-
ticipation and growth of others. Shared habits, therefore, provide the individual 
with an intrinsic ideal for conduct that serves as both a good and standard. As the 
good or aim of conduct, the ideal refers to the individual’s conscious tendency to 
develop his or her particular capacities in harmony with the demands and needs 
of others as they develop their own powers. As the standard of judgment, the ideal 
refers to the degree to which the individual actually brings about this harmony in 
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consequence of acting upon his or her conception of good. Through their attempts 
to realize a common good, individuals come to identify new interests and capaci-
ties for further growth, as well as additional responsibilities intrinsic to these new 
potentials. Thus, shared activity serves as the means by which to realize two prin-
ciples whose just relation makes up the democratic ideal: individual liberty and 
social equality.
Liberty is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities 
which take place only in rich and manifold association with others: the 
power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribution and 
enjoying in its own way the fruits of association. Equality denotes the un-
hampered share which each individual member of the community has in 
the consequences of associated action. It is equitable because it is measured 
only by need and capacity to utilize, not by extraneous factors which de-
prive one in order that another may take and have.9
Again, the growth of an individual’s interests (personal liberty) takes place 
within and by virtue of a social environment. Those affected make claims upon 
the individual to act in such a way that is considerate of and fair to the full devel-
opment of others (social equality). Justice, then, refers to the degree of harmony 
brought about in consequence of an individual’s growth in relation to the special 
demands of others. To the extent that the phrase “the common good” refers to and 
is a measure of this harmony, then “the common good” also signifies a measure of 
justice at any one given time. As a measure of justice, the common good serves as a 
guide for considering broader social claims to fairness and thus for forming a more 
thorough idea of the social ends to be served. Dewey puts the matter this way:
The tenor of this discussion is that the conception of common good, of 
general well-being, is a criterion which demands the full development of 
individuals in their distinctive individuality, not a sacrifice of them to some 
alleged vague larger good under the plea that it is “social.” Only when in-
dividuals have initiative, independence of judgment, flexibility, fullness of 
experience, can they act so as to enrich the lives of others and only in this 
way can a truly common welfare be built up. The other side of this state-
ment, and of the moral criterion, is that individuals are free to develop, 
to contribute and to share, only as social conditions break down walls of 
privilege and of monopolistic possession. . . . The criterion is identical 
in its political aspect with the democratic ideal. For democracy signifies, 
on one side, that every individual is to share in the duties and rights be-
longing to control of social affairs, and, on the other side, that social ar-
rangements are to eliminate those external arrangements of status, birth, 
wealth, sex, etc., which restrict the opportunity of each individual for full 
development of himself.10
Variation of social environment and practices, however, cultivates a variety 
of interests, valued ends, and habits of attention and judgment. Experience is shot 
through with competing judgments over the relative value of power. As Dewey sug-
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gests, social conflict is a fundamental datum. In light of all evidence that the growth 
and direction of human experience is not determined by any metaphysical absolutes 
or necessities, ill will and selfishness are just as ontologically possible as goodwill 
and altruism. Stated differently, human beings are just as capable of manipulating 
each other’s needs, desires, wants, and ways of judgment to serve and legitimize 
narrow, selfish ends as they are capable of directing each other to search and act 
for ends that appreciate in value and expand the lives of all. According to Dewey’s 
philosophical account of human conduct, individuals always should act so as to 
stimulate the growth of their own capacities with due care for the particular claims, 
needs, well-being, and development of others. This is to suggest that the moral sig-
nificance of any form of power, including business-school partnerships, should be 
judged according to the extent to which it expands and enriches the meaning of 
individual liberty in just relation to the meaning of social equality.
The quest for an enriched democratic justice requires free-flowing and broad 
communication about the consequences of shared activity. Mutual reference and 
exchange of ideas is vital for multiplying perceptions of possible resources, sharp-
ening consciousness of shared ends, and stoking the desire to excel beyond exist-
ing conceptions of good. Constant vigilance over existing efforts to meet social 
demands helps detect conditions that in effect set up unequal relations of power 
and that stifle freedom of individual growth. Persistent questioning and shared, 
critical inquiry help bring debilitating forms of power that coerce acceptance of 
these conditions to the light of social discussion and deliberation. However, the 
work of democracy does not take place merely by virtue of collective acceptance 
and general appeal to its abstract principles. The work of democracy can be made 
concrete, secured, refined, and extended only through the day-in and day-out ac-
tivities that human beings share. As Dewey suggests, “Only when we start from 
a community as a fact, grasp the fact in thought so as to clarify and enhance its 
constituent elements, can we reach an idea of democracy which is not utopian. The 
conceptions and shibboleths which are traditionally associated with the idea of 
democracy take on veridical and directive meaning only when they are construed 
as marks and traits of an association which realizes the defining characteristics of 
a community.”11 
Democracy as a moral ideal, therefore, challenges each individual to be ac-
tively engaged with the particular problems that arise within his or her various as-
sociations and that limit free and full contact with each other. Only through active 
concern for the community of good in which one is a part can problems be imme-
diately felt, understood, and appreciated with sympathy. Only through constant 
communication and critical reflection about shared ends and purposes, standards, 
and the special needs and capacities of all involved can existing efforts to satisfy 
social needs be measured, deficiencies be identified, and further work be suggested. 
Only when felt problems are communicated can a public form to discuss the value 
of existing power and, therefore, suggest and debate what forms of power are worth 
promoting or resisting. To deliberate about the forms of power to promote is to 
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struggle over what effective capacities should be cultivated. As Dewey suggests, to 
struggle over effective capacities is to struggle over what liberty should mean in the 
concrete and, by implication, what equality and justice should mean as well.
Liberty is not just an idea, an abstract principle. It is power, effective power 
to do specific things. There is no such thing as liberty in general; liberty, so 
to speak, at large. If one wants to know what the condition of liberty is at a 
given time, one has to examine what persons can do and what they cannot 
do. The moment one examines the question from the standpoint of effec-
tive action, it becomes evident that the demand for liberty is a demand for 
power, either for possession of powers of action not already possessed or 
for retention and expansion of powers already possessed. . . . Demand for 
increased power at one point means demands for change in the distribu-
tion of powers, that is, for less power somewhere else. You cannot discuss 
or measure the liberty of one individual or group of individuals without 
thereby raising the question of the effect upon the liberty of others. . . . 
Liberty is always a social question, not an individual one. For the liberties 
that any individual actually has depends upon the distribution of powers 
or liberties that exist, and this distribution is identical with actual social 
arrangements, legal and political—and, at the present time, economic, in 
a peculiarly important way.12
In the most basic sense, then, to be actively concerned for and engaged in the 
struggle for liberty is to take part in the discussion about what kind of community 
should be in the making and what sort of citizens are necessary to see it to fruition. 
Do we want a citizenry trained to be mere producers and consumers or should we 
aspire to more? Can a democracy exist when its citizens view themselves and their 
potential through the narrow lens of consumer materialism? Democracy demands, 
according to Dewey, nothing more or less than social and political engagement in 
the direction of shared experience. An education most fitting to democracy is one 
that consciously aims to cultivate “robust trustees of its own resources and ideals.”13 
That is, a democratic education must develop citizens with the affections, skills, 
intelligence, and virtues (effective habits or powers) necessary to assume social 
and political responsibility for themselves and their various communities, not to 
be mere cogs in an economic machine. Therefore, democratic education implies a 
political education.
A Democratic Theory of Education
As Dewey points out, “The problem of education in its relation to direction of so-
cial change is all one with the problem of finding out what democracy means in its 
total range of concrete applications: economic, domestic, international, religious, 
cultural, and political.”14 Insofar as democracy entails finding out what freedom 
and equality mean in a just relation with each other, then the ongoing problem of 
democratic justice—the problem of equalizing power—gives a general direction 
to the aims and methods of democratic education. The problem of justice demands 
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that schools cultivate character animated by social interests and sympathy and 
guided by social intelligence.
A character animated by social interests and sympathy refers to an individual 
who consciously appreciates the inherent social nature of human existence. To ap-
preciate is to feel and understand the quality of something, to sense its goods and 
standards. To appreciate the inherent social nature of existence entails the further 
recognition that human beings are creatures of acquired habit, the good of which 
should be a more refined and controlled interaction with the social environment. 
More specifically, it entails the conscious sense that human beings are living or-
ganisms whose life-sustaining activities are directly dependent upon the activities 
of others for formation, sustenance, and growth. To appreciate the social nature 
of humankind is to understand the fact that the growth of individuals can be se-
cured only as they take in, digest, and replenish the social nutrients that sustain 
them. This is to recognize that growth can be realized only as individuals attend 
to the particular aims, purposes, and skills of others, as well as to their demands 
to realize the good in a way that is considerate and careful of their particular needs 
and development. In the most fundamental sense, to appreciate the inherent social 
nature of human existence is to understand the basic fact that individual liberty or 
freedom to grow always involves the matter of a just relation with others who make 
up the social environment and who share in the consequences of growth. It is to 
recognize that the meaning of the good always should be a social good, the expan-
sion of which depends upon increasing the range and depth of sympathy one has 
for the needs, expectations, and demands of others. As Dewey suggests, “To put 
ourselves in the place of another, to see things from the standpoint of his aims and 
values, to humble our estimate of our own pretensions to the level they assume in the 
eyes of an impartial observer, is the surest way to appreciate what justice demands 
in concrete cases.”15 A character motivated by social interests, furthermore, is one 
charged by an affection for social well-being and by a “hatred for all that hinders this 
well-being.”16 Like all interests, a social interest signifies something active, in this 
case an active search for the concrete opportunities that expand and enrich mutual 
contact, as well as an active search for the arrangements that preclude, shut down, 
and distort free and open communication. By implication, then, a social interest 
suggests a special sensitivity for the persistent problems that plague shared activi-
ties and a special affection for the “underdog” who suffers most in consequence of 
these problems. In the most general sense, a character animated by social interests 
has not only an acute feel for the concrete problem of justice but a strong sense of 
responsibility for the conduct that causes and changes this problem. A sense of 
social welfare, as Dewey implies, induces a sense of responsibility, a sense of the 
necessity to know and reflect upon the conditions and consequences of conduct. 
“The tendency, moreover, of adopting social well-being as a standard is to make us 
intellectually sensitive and critical about the effects of laws, social arrangements, 
and education upon human happiness and development.”17
Simply put, intelligence refers to the effective power or capacity to search for 
and obtain adequate knowledge of actual and potential conditions so as to conduct 
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oneself more effectively and efficiently. Dewey suggests that intelligence refers to the 
“active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowl-
edge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which 
it tends.”18 More specifically, intelligence denotes a certain habit of mental attention 
that brings the how and why of conduct into immediate focus through the light of 
past experience. It is the inquiry into and identification of the “con-sequence” of 
ideas and facts for the purpose of judging the degree to which each grows out of and 
supports the occurrence of the others. Social intelligence, then, refers to the power 
of forming and judging the means and consequences of conduct on the growth of 
shared habits and conditions. Fundamentally, social intelligence signifies the social 
control of conduct mediated through individual character.
A character guided by social intelligence strives to be more perceptive, reflec-
tive, and judicious about the effects of conduct on the equal consideration and just 
development of all involved. This is to say, the problem of justice (again, the problem 
of equalizing power) fixes not only the end of social intelligence but its means as well. 
To approach the problem of justice by way of social intelligence requires certain at-
titudes or traits of character and modes of approach. Gaining adequate knowledge 
requires a skeptical attitude towards the surface or apparent meaning of facts. It re-
quires an insistent desire for a range of facts and evidence and an openness of mind 
to consider fully the significance of facts as reported from as many different perspec-
tives as possible. Thus, social intelligence entails a willingness to endure suspense and 
uncertainty of outcome until enough facts have been identified and mined for their 
concrete bearings. To act with social intelligence demands a tolerance or willingness 
to attend to and face the reported meanings of facts with sincerity, no matter how in 
congruent or conflicting these are with some particular interest. Furthermore, since 
the problem of democratic justice demands the consideration of facts according to 
the needs and claims of others, justice requires a character willing to seek out the 
perspectives of others as indispensable resources for guidance. 
As Dewey suggests, only by aiming to cultivate individuals guided by intelli-
gence and sympathy can a democratic society thrive. “Only as the coming generation 
learns in the schools to understand the social forces that are at work, the directions 
and the cross-directions in which they are moving, the consequences that they are 
reproducing, the consequences that they might produce if they were understood 
and managed with intelligence—only as the schools provide this understanding, 
have we any assurance that they are meeting the challenge which is put to them 
by democracy.”19 The pedagogical implication that follows is that critical, demo-
cratic habits of mind can form and mature only as they are fed constantly through 
practice. Thus, the only way to cultivate characters who will be actively engaged in 
the challenge of democracy is to engage them in the concrete challenges of justice. 
Therefore, a democratic education requires several important responsibilities of the 
schools in terms of the conditions, methods, and content of instruction. 
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School Context
First, the school must provide a context that ensures intellectual freedom and en-
courages shared inquiry, communication and deliberation. All those concerned with 
public education must be involved and vigilant in detecting relations of power that, 
intentionally or not, prevent, censor, or distort the freedom of inquiry, discussion, 
and expression. However, the identification of merely restrictive forms of power 
is not enough. Dewey’s reminder that powerful groups have influenced shared in-
stitutions so as to condition others to accept, desire, and blindly act for ends anti-
thetical to the growth of personal freedom should give a more critical edge to the 
watchdog responsibilities of the public.20 The possibility that powerful ill-willed 
individuals can—and, in fact, do—use the public schools to gain hegemonic control 
over other people’s perspectives should make all concerned about a public educa-
tion more wary and discriminating of the vested interests that permeate schools. 
The increasing presence of marketing in public schools serves as an opportunity 
for critical engagement about the intent and purpose of corporate involvement in 
schools. What are the benefits, what are the effects, how so, and for whom?
Of course, the relative effect and value of power are matters of judgment and, 
therefore, matters to be contested and debated. This is to say that education neces-
sarily is involved in the larger political discussion about what kind of community 
should be in the making. It is immersed in the collective deliberation and struggle 
over the effects of existing power on the growth of freedom, the types of associations 
or powers that should be fostered, and the habits of character necessary to develop 
these associations into conscious communities of good. A primary responsibility of 
all those committed to a democratic education (especially administrators, teachers, 
and parents) is to make sure that the school serves as the best example of democracy 
in the political engagement about the direction of experience. This responsibility 
entails making the school a citadel for the methods indispensable to a thriving cul-
tural and political democracy. If schools are to produce active political citizens, the 
atmosphere of the school must be saturated with a spirit of public participation and 
civic courage. “It is idle to expect the schools to send out young men and women 
who will stand actively and aggressively for the cause of free intelligence in meeting 
social problems and attaining the goal of freedom unless the spirit of free intelligence 
pervades the organization, administration, studies, and methods of the school itself. 
. . . Eternal vigilance is the price of the conservation and extension of freedom, and 
the schools should be the ceaseless guardians and creators of this vigilance.”21
Content and Methods of Instruction 
As Dewey points out above, securing a context that is conducive to intellectual free-
dom is one element in the shaping of characters who are able to form ideas that are 
socially relevant. Therefore, the second responsibility of the schools is to provide an 
organized set of experiences that socially and politically engage students such that 
critical, intelligent sympathy develops as a necessary habit of practice. Dewey’s 1922 
criticism of public schools in terms of their instructional duties is worth quoting at 
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length because it offers a timeless suggestion for what the general content and meth-
ods of democratic schools should be.
Our schooling does not educate, if by education be meant a trained habit 
of discriminating inquiry and discriminating belief, the ability to look 
beneath a floating surface to detect the conditions that fix the contour 
of the surface, and the forces which create its waves and drifts. . . . This 
fact determines the fundamental criticism to be leveled against current 
schooling, against what passes as an educational system. It not only does 
little to make discriminating intelligence a safeguard against surrender to 
the invasion of bunk, especially in its most dangerous form—social and 
political bunk—but it does much to favor susceptibility to a welcoming 
reception of it. There appear to be two chief causes for this ineptitude. 
One is the persistence, in the body of what is taught, of traditional mate-
rial which . . . affords no resource for discriminating insight, no protection 
against being duped in facing the emergencies of today. . . . The other way 
in which schooling fosters an undiscriminating gulping mental habit, ea-
ger to be duped, is positive. It consists in a systematic, almost deliberate, 
avoidance of the spirit of criticism in dealing with history, politics, and 
economics. There is an implicit belief that this avoidance is the only way 
by which to produce good citizens. The more undiscriminating the his-
tory and institutions of one’s own nation are idealized, the greater is the 
likelihood, so it is assumed, that the school product will be a loyal patriot, a 
well-equipped good citizen. If the average boy and girl could be walled off 
from all ideas and information about social affairs save those acquired in 
school, they would enter upon the responsibilities of social membership in 
complete ignorance that there are any social problems, any political evils, 
any industrial defects. They would go forth with the supreme confidence 
that the way lies open to all, and that the sole cause of failure in business, 
family life or citizenship lies in some personal deficiency in character. . . . 
The effect is to send students out into actual life in a condition of acquired 
and artificial innocence. Such perceptions as they may have of the reali-
ties of social struggles and problems they have derived incidentally, by the 
way, and without the safeguards of intelligent acquaintance with facts 
and impartially conducted discussion. It is no wonder that they are ripe 
to be gulled, or that their attitude is one which merely perpetuates exist-
ing confusion, ignorance, prejudice, and credulity. Reaction from this 
impossible naïve idealization of institutions as they are produces indif-
ference and cynicism.22
To produce good citizens—that is, individuals who are sympathetic and 
responsible for the direction of experience—requires supplying the concrete op-
portunities that will elicit these traits as genuine, active responses. It follows that 
the subject matter of education can be nothing less than shared experience itself. 
Since shared experience fundamentally consists of shared habits and practices, in 
the most elemental sense the curricular and instructional responsibilities of the 
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school must be to widen and enrich the students’ native interest in the social activi-
ties that compose their particular community of experience. This should be done 
by enlisting their energies in trying out and undergoing a myriad of practices that 
will enhance their natural sensitivity to and curiosity for what their community 
life is like.
The importance of shared practices for curriculum and instruction cannot 
be overstated. Shared practices develop in response to the particular problems and 
demands of the social environment. Thus, they are the particular means to realize 
specific consequences in experience. Again, as Dewey plainly states it, “Concrete 
habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving, 
and reasoning that is done.”23 They are the special powers by which to form and 
regulate experience with efficiency and meaning. Furthermore, shared practices 
are the forms of human association. They serve as the mechanisms by which to re-
alize further connections with other forms of human activity and to understand 
the intimate interactions between people that make community life possible and 
important. Directly engaging students in the concrete activities of community life 
provides the best stimulus to induce students to find out what the special demands 
and purposes of community life are. In turn, a developing sense of shared ends and 
demands gives social purpose to the need to acquire special methods for gathering 
facts and generating ideas and for developing special techniques and skills neces-
sary to execute plans. A sense of shared ideals and demands gives reason for the 
need to attend to and judge consequences more carefully and to modify plans in 
light of their consequences. As Dewey suggests, “Things gain meaning when they 
are used as means to bring about consequences (or as means to prevent the occur-
rence of undesired consequences), or as standing for consequences for which we 
have to discover means. The relation of means-consequence is the centre and heart 
of all understanding.”24 On the most elementary level, therefore, the school should 
involve students in shared activities such that the means-consequence relation and 
the inherent human responsibility for this relation become the constant integrat-
ing themes of their educational experience. The different content areas of the tra-
ditional curriculum represent the various ways of approaching this relation and 
therefore represent the different ways of stating, analyzing, and understanding it. 
It follows that all subsequent efforts in terms of instructional content and method 
should bring the social significance of the means-consequence relation to greater 
degrees of consciousness. This is to say, the elementary development of attention 
through shared practices has instructional significance for engaging students to 
take up the problem of democratic justice.
As pointed out above, shared practices are the particular means to specific 
consequences in the social environment. When transferred into personal abil-
ity, shared practices are effective capacities, liberties, or, to put it in more relevant 
terms, powers to act. Since liberties always produce social effects, liberties always 
entail the social question of justice, the question of harmonious balance between 
the capacities of one and the capacities of all. Directly engaging students in the 
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means-consequence relation, which makes up the central nerve of shared practices, 
furnishes the most direct mechanism by which students can develop an intimate 
sensitivity to and personal responsibility for the problem of justice in its various 
concrete manifestations. 
The problem for instruction is selecting and arranging the experiences nec-
essary to lead students to define the good of a particular activity and to develop a 
sense of what expectations and demands should guide their consideration of conse-
quences and means. By way of developing an idea of goods and standards, students 
come to sense for themselves the special problems and conflicts intrinsic to a par-
ticular shared activity. That is, a developing interest in realizing a particular shared 
good provides the prime condition for a heightened sensitivity and attention to the 
ideas, beliefs, and relations that block or hinder the full satisfaction of the good. As 
students are engaged in forming and measuring shared goods, they implicitly are 
forming and judging powers and consequences, liberty and equality—justice. The 
role of the teacher becomes that of suggesting and magnifying the social, economic, 
and political implications of felt problems such that questions of justice serve ex-
plicitly as stimuli to call out and sharpen social intelligence as a response.
In the most basic sense, the role of the teacher is to serve as a resource for 
suggestion and guidance. The instructional task, then, includes directing students 
in bringing felt problems to a more acute, articulated focus by suggesting and sup-
plying additional materials, accounts, and claims to be researched. This function 
entails leading students into a careful study of the history of particular problems 
to see what specific events and assumptions of meaning inform their manifesta-
tions. Thus, the teacher should serve as a model for sound habits of investigation. 
This involves helping students search for and gather relevant facts and examine 
and test the relations between facts so as to induce a clearer understanding of the 
particular ideas of good and demands of right these facts embody or ignore. More 
specifically in terms of power, the teacher carries the responsibility of making ex-
plicit the point that underlying ideas of good and right represent specific relations of 
power, specific ideas of liberty or effective capacity, specific demands for increased 
capacity, constrained capacity, or redistributed capacity. The job of the teacher is to 
help students uncover and untangle the particular interests served by relations of 
power as these are embedded in historical facts and have come to bear upon pres-
ently felt problems. Therefore, the more critical and political aspect of teaching 
is directing students in identifying, deliberating about, and judging the effects of 
power on the development of shared habits, desires, needs, and ways of judgment. 
This task involves leading students in tracing and examining the particular means 
used to legitimize one way of acting, one form of power, over another. Of course, 
engaging students in these political tasks depends upon the creative ability to select 
experiences that will lead students to identify problems extensive enough in social 
scope so as to require them to seek out the perspectives of others, both historical 
and current. Therefore, another responsibility of teaching is to help students build 
a wider and more enriched forum of community experience.
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By use of the extensive nature of the problem of justice itself, the teacher must 
lead students to see that only as they draw upon the lived experiences and stories 
of others can they gather a range of facts and judgments necessary to bring par-
ticular injustices into adequate focus. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the teacher 
to cultivate in students a strong sense that only as they seek out the perspectives of 
others can they come to hear and feel a variety of living testaments of past events, 
episodes, and effects of power. Mutual reference, in turn, should lend an emotional 
charge and significance to students’ intellectual search, particularly as they struggle 
to identify and measure competing ideas of good and right. What students should 
come to see is that free and open discussion serves as a vital means by which they 
may become alert to subtle forms of exploitation that they had not yet taken into 
account. An intimate exchange of perspective should serve as the indispensable 
medium by which students come to confront the consequences of exploitation as 
these are manifested in impulses, desires, and ways of judgment. Through mutual 
conference students can come to help each other demystify hegemonic forms of 
power as natural and outside of human change. Moreover, drawing upon the stories 
of others should allow students to come to consciousness of past struggles of protest 
and resistance. In turn, these past struggles should provide rich suggestions as to 
how to form effective coalitions of resistance against current injustices and offer 
insights about how to nourish more intimate associations with others. Therefore, 
the teacher’s duty in this regard is to underscore the significance of assembling a 
tribunal of others that will act as an authoritative resource by which students can 
come to test, correct, and sharpen their ideas of the good to be served and the re-
sponsibilities inherent in serving it.
The upshot of this discussion leads to a simple but indispensable educational 
principle. As Dewey states it, “The only way to prepare for social life is to engage 
in social life. To form habits of social usefulness and serviceableness apart from 
any direct social need and motive, and apart from any existing social situation, is, 
to the letter, teaching the child to swim by going through motions outside of the 
water. The most indispensable condition is left out, and the results correspond-
ingly futile.”25 
It was asserted at the beginning of this paper that public education serves 
as an instrument in the regulation of social and political sentiment required by 
a capitalist system. The idea of self-development fostered in schools is reduced to 
the goods, services, and images available for purchase. The moral life of citizen-
ship in schools is one based upon the shared commitment to an economic sys-
tem that promises ever higher standards of living and levels of consumption of 
common goods. Democracy, the idea that individuals morally should be free and 
equal in the pursuit of happiness as each sees fit as long as this pursuit somehow 
contributes to the well-being of others, then becomes bastardized to mean each 
individual’s right and responsibility to pursue happiness defined solely in terms of 
material goods. This narrow conception of being in the world leads to the kind of 
society Max Weber anticipated in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: 
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a society characterized by “mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of 
convulsive self-importance,” one consisting of “specialists without spirit, sensual-
ists without heart.”26 Dewey’s conception of democracy and education entails an 
understanding of self-development as wide, robust, and meaningful as the human 
ability to feel, appreciate, and imagine the infinite connections that we do and can 
share with each other. Only as a more enchanting spirit of democracy is breathed 
into our children through every aspect of their public school experience can we 
hope that they will develop the souls necessary to transcend the “iron cage” that 
Weber warned us about a century ago.
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